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RESEARCH

Understanding Understanding: Interdisciplinary
Articulation for Instruction and Assessment
W. Douglas Baker and Elisabeth Däumer

A

s teachers and researchers we strive to observe when and how students understand
a concept, a process, or other selected disciplinary or subject matter knowledge. Yet,
how we define understand, or the process of
understanding, and how we operationalize and describe it in
our daily practice, is often ambiguous. This raises a key question: how can we assess students’ understanding when we are
uncertain as to what we mean by understanding, or what demonstrates understanding looks like in action—particularly when
students are in the “ugly” or awkward stages of developing
or reflecting knowledge?
Defining key terms, or threshold concepts, becomes
important for how we assess students and for how we distribute analysis or information about evaluations of students’
learning (Estrem, 2015), and these concepts are sometimes
linked to learning outcomes beyond our classrooms. Therefore, transparency of definitions and planned operationalization of them become critical. For example, what it means
for secondary school students to understand a text—and
how we prepare teacher candidates to guide others to understand texts and assess those understandings—are linked
to the Common Core State Standards (CCSS). The word
understanding(s) appears at least 100 times in the CCSS, yet the
definition and suggested actions that lead to understanding(s)
are obscured or only implied. In the past, this type of omission provided instructors flexibility in planning and initiating curricula and classroom practices that would guide students to learn local knowledge. However, the consequences
of standardized testing of students’ knowledge of the CCSS
and our classroom assessment of students’ understanding(s)
urge us to closely examine key terms such as understanding in
order to make transparent how they are defined, by and for
whom, under what conditions, and for what purposes.
As colleagues with different disciplinary backgrounds
and perspectives in the same university English department
(Doug in English Education and Elisabeth in Literature), we
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have explored interpretation of literary texts for our individual and collective purposes, and here we turn to understanding texts and implications for how we assess students. Since
we both contribute to preparing secondary English teachers
(teacher candidates must take two methods and seven literature courses at our institution), and since teachers typically
teach how they were taught (Marshall & Smith, 1997), the
way we initiate and develop classroom practices influences
how a sizable number of secondary school students learn
to interpret texts, and how they are assessed. Furthermore,
in planning to team-teach a graduate course on interpreting
and teaching literature, we quickly recognized the need to explore across disciplines the complexity of understanding, and
we learned to view our disciplinary differences as resources
(Baker & Däumer, 2015) and to value the distributed knowledge we brought to our conversations and this project.
Our goal for this article is to describe a process that
led us to develop a working definition of understanding by
adapting research methods from each of our fields. Yet, we
conclude with a telling case (Mitchell, 1984) of when we as
instructors misunderstood a student’s public demonstration
of his understanding of a text. Instead of describing a case
when we accurately recognized a student’s understanding, we
elected to examine when we misunderstood because that experience led us to explore dilemmas of assessing students’
understanding, particularly the lack of a transparent definition for understanding.
Although paradigmatic definitions exist for understanding (e.g., Wiggins & McTighe, 2005), how we operationalize
the term, or what counts in our classes as understanding, is
dependent on our perspective of the term and on how we
demonstrate it through interactions with students. We wondered how a cross-disciplinary inquiry could lead us to develop a stance on understanding, one that we would be willing
to describe, observe, and reflect on for purposes of enhancing instructional approaches and benefiting other teachers
and our students.

W. Douglas Baker and Elisabeth Däumer

Building an Interdisciplinary Approach to
Understanding
Although the fields of English Education and Literature
are linked, they represent different disciplines, the former
focuses on the preparation and support of English teachers and the latter on interpretation of literary texts. Through
our discussions over the years, we have recognized that we
cite different scholars in our research, we typically focus on
different questions, and we engage in different methodological approaches toward discovering answers to our questions.
(Of course, English educators who have focused on hermeneutics may view these fields as more aligned than has been
our experience.)
As we prepared and began to team-teach a graduate
course on literary interpretation and pedagogy we began
to examine how we observed and assessed students’ understanding of texts. Similar to the lack of definitions of understanding in the CCSS, we discovered that as teachers we
often omit discrete definitions of the construct, or neglect
to reveal to students what constitutes understanding in our
classes; furthermore, we recognized that perspectives on understanding are not shared across disciplinary boundaries.
These omissions and observations led us to talk across academic fields to define this central term and make visible for
what purposes we do so.
The ambiguity of understanding is not a singular case.
For example, the ubiquitous terms context and literacy lack
shared definitions across disciplines—even within disciplines—yet how these are defined and operationalized determines what students have access to for learning and influence
how policymakers and other stakeholders make decisions. In
their examination of the term context across three prominent
research journals, Rex, Green, and Dixon (1998) discovered
a lack of common definitions or attempts to describe how
the term was operationalized in research studies. Green and
Dixon (2002) described a range of how context is operationalized or defined and concluded that the “differing views of
context show that without an understanding of what each
researcher means by context or what each group reading the
research understands context to be, the influence or role of
context in literacy will remain invisible” (p. 107). Similarly,
Sylvia Scribner (1984) famously observed that how literacy is
defined has implications for how it is viewed, by whom and
for what purposes, and that the choice of metaphors used to
define literacy (e.g., “literacy as power”) has implications and
consequences for teachers and students.

The Need for Articulation Across Levels
The lack of transparent definitions of key terms (e.g.,
understanding in the CCSS) has consequences for instruction
and the opportunities students have for learning. According
to the College and Career Readiness Standards, students will
be “expected to meet each year’s grade-specific standards, retain or further develop skills and understandings mastered
in preceding grades, and work steadily toward meeting the
more general expectations described by the CCR standards”
(CCSS, p. 4). Public rhetoric demanding that students demonstrate “higher order” thinking skills, meet “challenging State
academic and content standards,” and “develop skills and
understandings [italics added] mastered in preceding grades”
(CCSS, p. 4) appear inarguable. Who does not want students
to be able to demonstrate these? (Similarly, who would argue to leave a child behind?) However, these expectations
raise questions. For example, what are “higher order thinking skills,” or what constitutes “challenging academic and
content standards”? What does it look or sound like when
students master understandings? For example, what does it
mean to understand a text and be able to demonstrate that
understanding? These questions spawn a litany of others:
According to whom? For whom? Under what conditions or
contexts? For what purposes and for what desired outcomes?
On the surface, answers to these questions seem evident, as they were crafted to be. They are ostensibly designed
so that K-12 schools will construct “rigorous” curriculum to
lead students to “develop the skills in reading, writing, speaking, and listening that are the foundation for any creative
and purposeful expression in language” (p. 3). Although the
CCSS “do not describe all that can or should be taught,” and
“[a] great deal is left to the discretion of teachers and curriculum developers” (p. 6), what will count as the standards
will be brought to bear on the students (and teachers) by the
test chosen by the state, and by instructional practices in class
over time. Of course, dilemmas emerge.
In preparation for pending tests, there have been few, if
any, opportunities for teachers across grade levels and higher
education to discuss what might constitute understanding,
particularly as presumed by the CCSS. Therefore, educators
must seek clarity about, for example, what it means to understand and what it means to demonstrate understanding, especially for purposes of designing curricula, preparing students
for standardized assessments, arguing for what is best for
students beyond these tests, and creating opportunities for
articulation across disciplines and institutional boundaries.
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If we accept that knowledge of key terms and how they
are operationalized is situated within local contexts (e.g., Gee
& Green, 1998; Street, 2005), how might we generate crossdisciplinary inquiry that could lead us to further develop a
stance that we are willing to describe, defend, and explore
with colleagues and students? How, for example, might professors of English education and professors of literature discuss and negotiate instructional approaches for how teachers
(and teacher candidates) prepare students to interpret texts
and demonstrate understandings of texts? What constitutes
understanding and how do we make the definition(s) transparent?

A Methodological Approach to Answering the
Questions
Well-reasoned definitions of understanding for education do, of course, exist. In their seminal text Understanding
by Design (2005), Wiggins & McTighe provide an educational perspective of understanding through layers of definitions, particularly drawing on the work of John Dewey
(1910/1933), Benjamin Bloom (1956), and Jerome Bruner
(1960), and suggest approaches for designing curricula that
guide students to “really understand what they are asked to
learn” (p. 4). Most importantly for our purposes, they present
a chapter on “understanding understanding” and argue that
a clear definition of understanding will guide teachers to design more effective instruction for purposes of assessing students’ understanding. However, the complexity of the term,
as evidenced by the multiple definitions they present, makes
a definitive perspective of the term—and agreed upon practices that demonstrate it—layered and elusive. For example,
Wiggins and McTighe state, “Understanding is multidimensional and complicated” (p. 84), and “understanding is about
wise performance—transfer and use of big ideas—not mere
recall” (p. 250). They describe six facets of understanding, or
“manifestations of transfer ability” (p. 84), including explanation, interpretation, application, perspective, empathy, and
self-knowledge.
Their definitions of understanding also provide military
and archeological metaphors that signal physical aspects of
the construct. For example, they depict understanding(s) as a
‘target,’ something students “aim” for, and as an archeological process: “You have to ‘dig’ below the ‘surface’ (i.e., the
‘cover’) to ‘uncover’ unobvious ‘core’ insights. Understanding ‘takes time and practice.’ Understandings are ‘hard won,’
not immediate—maybe even overlooked or unseen by those
30	LAJM, Fall 2015

with lots of knowledge” (p. 46). Transfer of knowledge is
integral to the key definition they offer:
To understand is to be able to wisely and effectively
use—transfer—what we know, in context; to apply knowledge and skill effectively in realistic tasks
and settings. To understand means that we show
evidence of being able to transfer what we know.
When we understand, we have a fluent and fluid
grasp, not a rigid, formulaic grasp based only on
recall and ‘plugging in.’ (p. 7)
However, implied in their notion of “transfer” is a connection with the autonomous model of literacy that Street
(2005), among others, argues against. That is, literacy itself
will autonomously, “irrespective of the social conditions and
cultural interpretations,” lead to improved performances
(p. 417). Furthermore, Wiggins and McTighe add a problematic component of “correctness”: “To understand is to have
done it in the right way, often reflected in being able to explain why a particular skill, approach, or body of knowledge
is or is not appropriate in a particular situation” (p. 39). From
our perspective, what constitutes “the right way” is embedded in and dependent upon contextual factors (which they
implicitly acknowledge), a perspective described by philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer, as we discuss later.
However, Wiggins and McTighe also argue “that student
misunderstanding is a far bigger problem than we may realize, and that assessment of understanding therefore requires
evidence that cannot be gained from traditional fact-focusing
testing alone” (p. 7). Although we certainly agree that testing
alone cannot adequately assess students’ understandings, we
view misunderstandings—including teachers’—as opportunities for exploration, which Wiggins and McTighe acknowledge: “ . . . misunderstanding is incredibly valuable to teachers, not a mere mistake to be corrected” (p. 51). This position
raises questions about misunderstanding and about teacher
knowledge and expertise.
Implicit in Wiggins & McTighe’s discussion are assumptions about the expertise of teachers and their capacity to
observe and assess students’ understandings toward meeting
desired outcomes: teachers will be able to recognize when
students are (mis)understanding. This assumption becomes
problematic when observing classroom interactions and
focusing on students’ (or teachers’) discursive actions (e.g.,
what happens when a teacher misunderstands a student during class discussion?). In other words, while Wiggins and
McTighe supply layers of a priori perspectives of understanding, we recognized the need to build a local definition of
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understanding that would guide us to observe and acknowledge when students or teachers (mis)understand within selected contexts, particularly within our team-taught course.

Constructing a Working Definition of
Understanding(s)
As we turned toward our process of developing a shared
definition, we began with a critical assumption: understandings are situated and constructed through discursive practices of a group (Gee & Green, 1998; Street, 2005; Bloome
et al., 2005). In other words, understanding something is a
process embedded within local contexts and the interactions
of participants of a group over time; and, generated definitions inform how evidence for what counts to members of
the group as understanding is recognized and acknowledged.
Therefore, although definitions of understanding are available, we value the process of exploring and building a working definition, including analyzing understanding through an
example classroom interaction.
We focused on understanding a text, and the four methods we used to shape a local, working definition of understanding grew from our (inter)disciplinary backgrounds.
First, we briefly conducted a taxonomic analysis of how
understanding is used in the CCSS by the writers of the
document, and we offer representative examples. Next, as
literary scholars often do, we consulted the Oxford English
Dictionary (OED) for etymological and denotative meanings of understanding. Since we focus on literary texts, we then
turned to philosopher and literary theorist Hans-Georg Gadamer’s perspective on understanding. Finally, we describe an
example classroom interaction between a student and two
teachers that demonstrates how understanding is (mis)understood through discursive action in a selected context (e.g.,
a classroom discussion). In a sense, the example becomes a
cautionary tale of how instructors’ misunderstanding of students’ understanding demonstrates complexities of assessing understanding. But first, as an example, we turned to the
CCSS to analyze how understanding is defined by writers of
that document.

Using an Ethnographic Perspective to Examine
CCSS’s Use of Understanding
James Spradley (1980), a cultural anthropologist, described ways to develop a taxonomy of a selected construct or action in order to learn how a particular group
views a concept, or action, etc., especially through

interactions among the community of people who engage in a
particular phenomenon and display their understanding of
it—in other words, observing what counts as a term or action
to the group. We used this approach to uncover the apparent definition(s) of understanding(s) suggested by the writers
of the CCSS. The key to this inquiry process is to step away
from ethnocentrism (i.e., from our own assumptions and values that are based on our experiences) and observe from the
group’s perspective (Green, Skukauskaite & Baker, 2012)—in
this case, the writers of the document. Sometimes, especially
when researchers do not have a “cultural guide” to supply local information, they must begin with what they can observe
and look for patterns or evidence that might support initial
claims. Our analysis of the CCSS is not part of an ethnography, yet we adapt principles of ethnography to examine how
understanding is used within particular contexts (i.e., by the
writers, for schools and teachers, for purposes of assessing
students and evaluating schools).
For example, through analysis of
the CCSS for English Language Arts, Although definitions
we searched for the term understanding(s), of understanding are
listed the sentences it appears in, and available, we value
inferred criteria or definitions for the the process of
term’s usage. (The process is similar to exploring and
how the OED constructs an entry for building a working
a word—sentences with the selected definition, including
word are collected and collated, and analyzing
definitions are inferred based upon understanding
usage.) The CCSS document reflects through an example
particular values and cultural practices, classroom interaction.
so this approach makes sense when the
goal is to uncover assumptions of the documents or aspects
of it. (The next step would be to interview the writers of the
CCSS to corroborate the accuracy of our claims, although
this step is beyond the scope and purpose of this article.)
Table 1 (see Appendix A) lists representative sentences
that contain understanding(s) found in the opening pages of
the CCSS for English Language Arts & Literacy in History/
Social Studies, Science, and Technical Studies. In this table,
understandings is a noun, which include the following qualities: understandings can be specified and required by multiple
subject areas as prerequisites for college readiness; they are to
be demonstrated, retained, and mastered; and they have a relationship to skills—evidenced by the sequential usage of the
two terms. A dominant usage of understandings can be observed throughout the standards following the transitive verb
demonstrate; therefore, to demonstrate understandings is to
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display knowledge that one possesses, not provide evidence
for an action or process.
However, the document provides examples that suggest
a process. For example, “Integrate information…to develop
a coherent understanding of a topic or issue” (“Integration
of Knowledge and Ideas,” Grade 6, p. 39). The definitive
form, “to understand,” is used a few times and implies that
understand is an action that requires diligent work, emerges
over time, and that students must seek it (CCSS, p. 7). Yet,
the multiple definitions of the root word, understand, and
the variations of it in the CCSS reflect complexities of the
term, particularly that it is used within different contexts and
for different purposes: understanding is not simply understanding and that what counts as definitions of the term is
constructed by the users of the document, or by the group
engaged in enacting it. Therefore, we turned to the OED to
seek clarity of the meaning.

Understanding in the Oxford English
Dictionary
According to the OED, the verb understand means “to
comprehend; to apprehend the meaning; to grasp; be thoroughly acquainted.” Of course, the key issue is what counts
in a classroom or on a standardized test as comprehending,
apprehending, grasping and becoming thoroughly acquainted? The etymology of understand includes “to step under” or
“to take upon oneself, to venture, to presume.” Therefore,
historically, to understand suggests presuming, taking risks
and stepping under a stance of another. Moreover, since understand is a compound word, we perused the many definitions of stand, and the seventh entry of the OED suggests
an interesting view of the word: aside from literal meanings
(e.g., maintaining “an erect attitude on one’s feet”) and the
figurative (e.g., “stand in another’s shoes”), to stand with an
adverb can imply a “change of place, distance or the like,…
[or] the notion of movement as a preliminary to the static
position” (e.g., to stand aside, back, down,…off, out of, up).
With under as the adverb, understand suggests a position
beneath a stance, or making assumptions about someone
else’s stance (e.g., a writer’s, a speaker’s, etc.). Therefore, to
understand suggests that a person observes a stance, a position, and seeks to comprehend or grasp it; to understand
reflects a response to someone, an idea, an attitude, etc., and
an effort to strive to match what a reader or listener comprehends with the writer’s or speaker’s presumed meanings.
Therefore, understand can be viewed as a relational term or
32	LAJM, Fall 2015

activity. As a noun or gerund, understanding is a product of
a process, and as a verb it is an ongoing process that leads
to a product. This dual perspective fits well with literary interpretation. Therefore, we chose to explore a philosophical
perspective on interpretation and understanding that might
center us on how we approach the process of grasping or
comprehending a text in order to demonstrate knowledge of
it. For a primary example of such a perspective, we chose
the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer, an influential German
philosopher of the twentieth century who explored understanding, particularly in terms of literary interpretation (Elisabeth’s area of expertise), and described understanding as an
open-ended, continuous, linguistic and interpretive process.

Gadamer on Understanding
Gadamer (2006) argued an idea that for most English
teachers seems unequivocal: readers bring to a text their
experiences and subjectivities—their “fore-knowledge” or
“fore-understandings,” and these contribute to the reader’s
“horizon,” or what is possible for the reader to comprehend
or grasp. For Gadamer, the “horizon is the range of vision
that includes everything that can be seen from a particular
vantage point” (p. 735), and this horizon is defined, first of
all, by a reader’s location—linguistically and historically (Gadamer’s interests), but also socially, institutionally, and experientially. According to Gadamer, the horizon we bring to understanding a text can be challenged, and through the reader’s
encounter with the “otherness” of a text, including its challenge to “customary usage” of words (p. 722), understanding
can be significantly broadened; yet it cannot be transcended.
Given Gadamer’s insistence on the integral role of foremeanings that we project as readers when trying to grasp a
text, his simultaneously articulated goal of achieving “right
interpretation” and a “right horizon,” and his concern with
protecting a text “from misunderstanding from the start” (p.
723), it becomes evident how his thinking about understanding is pertinent for our inquiry, especially since students are
often faced with demonstrating a “correct” understanding of
an idea or text.
A “correct interpretation,” Gadamer writes, “must be
on guard against arbitrary fancies and the limitations imposed by imperceptible habits of thought and direct its
gaze ‘on the things themselves’” (p. 722). The only way to
do so is to become aware of such habits of thoughts, so
as to avoid “blindly” holding on to fore-meanings (p. 723),
even when they are questioned or undermined by the text.
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Distinguishing between “true prejudices, by which we understand,” and “false ones by which we misunderstand,”
Gadamer describes the interpretive process as one in which
readers become conscious of the prejudices governing their
own understanding, so that the text, “as another’s meaning,
can be isolated and valued on its own” (p. 733).
What further complicates, or layers, Gadamer’s notion
of understanding a text is the concept of tradition: the critical, interpretive discourse that has developed around a text
and in which over time the horizons of the text and that of
successive readers fuse together (p. 737). In other words, a
“correct” understanding of a text, particularly one from an
earlier historical period, needs to take into account the interpretive tradition and acknowledge the existence of prior, and
institutionally sanctioned, interpretive efforts. The concept
of tradition is an indication of Gadamer’s conservatism, designed to constrain the proliferation of new interpretations.
And yet, he is clear that such constraints are not based on
notions of objectivity but on negotiated, institutionally sanctioned understandings.
Gadamer developed his theory of hermeneutics specifically for the understanding of texts removed by history—i.e.,
texts that readers seek to connect with across the gulf of centuries, historical periods, and altered language usages (including earlier forms of a language). This fact raises legitimate
questions about the usefulness of his theory for our purposes
of understanding what it means to understand literary texts
studied in English language arts classrooms, particularly the
multiple layers of understanding that occur through interactions among teacher and students. However, what makes
Gadamer’s theory particularly apt is his insistence on understanding as a relational process, whose theoretical and ethical
implications he illuminates through frequent interpersonal
analogies. He explains his notion of “right understanding,”
for instance, with reference to our everyday efforts at understanding the meaning of another: “All that is asked is that we
remain open to the meaning of the other person or of the
text. But this openness always includes our placing the other
meaning in a relation with the whole of our own meanings or
ourselves in a relation to it” (p. 723).
Despite his focus on the interpretation of temporally
removed texts, then, Gadamer offers a nuanced model for
the complexity of understanding as a relational process, requiring not only cognitive capacities—to grasp, to analyze,
to speculate, to presume, to ask self-reflexive questions—
but also emotional and social ones: to empathize with the
meanings of another, to open oneself to strangeness and the

possibilities of misunderstanding that can only be productively engaged when readers allow their fore-meanings full
play. Ultimately, “right understanding,” as Gadamer proposes, cannot be measured in terms of “content” alone but
needs to be measured as well in terms of process of inquiry
or interpretation. There is never simply one right understanding but an unfolding process of understandings guided by
the principle of self-aware attentiveness to the text and the
reader’s own process of grasping it.

So What?
Using the above three segments of our process (examining usage of understanding in the CCSS, consulting the
OED, and exploring Gadamer’s perspective), we arrived at
a local, working definition of understanding: To understand
requires making assumptions, offering preliminary, presumptive interpretations grounded in specific details from a text, and “taking a
stand”—particularly in response to another’s or a text’s perspective or
stance. Contrasting one’s understanding of an idea, text, etc.
with those of others within a community is a key part of
the process of understanding. Two main aspects are apparent: internal dialogues with a text, which have embedded
social contexts, and public ones with others who have also
read, viewed, or heard the text. For example, understanding
an idea delivered by an author in the form of an essay or
novel requires that readers interpret the text; that is, read and
consider it by bringing to bear past experiences (their “horizons”), recognizing contexts (or “horizons”) of the writer or
writing, deciding on purposes of reading and interpreting the
text, developing claims about the text based on evidence, and
sharing and negotiating the claims and reasoning with others.
The CCSS’s representation of understanding belies the
distinction Gadamer proposes: instead of exploring “an unfolding process of understandings,” students must learn that
there are right answers that will prove their capacity to demonstrate understanding, particularly on a single test. There is
no opportunity in that context for students to demonstrate a
“relational” or inquiry process, one that leads to an interpretation or stance on a text. This dilemma raises questions for
school teachers, who must prepare students to prove their
capacity to demonstrate understanding: how can teachers
observe what appears to count as understanding for the developers of the CCSS in planning curricula? More broadly,
how can teachers engage students in complex and situated
practices that help them develop understandings of texts and
demonstrate those understandings?
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Further, the situated and complex nature of defining
understanding raises questions for teachers and teacher educators: What does understanding look like in classrooms?
How can teachers recognize when students are engaged in
the process of understanding particular ideas, practices, sequential actions, etc.? In the next section, we describe a telling
case (Mitchell, 1984) of a classroom interaction that occurred
during the graduate course on interpreting and teaching literature. In particular, the case becomes a cautionary tale of
teachers’ misunderstandings of a student’s understanding.

Example Classroom Interaction:
(Mis)Understanding
Context: We received a grant from the College of Arts
and Sciences to team-teach a course designed for teachers
and graduate students of literature; and we secured approval from the students and the Internal Review Board to use
course materials and records to also conduct research, particularly on the interactions among participants around texts.
The class met once a week (15 meetings) for nearly three
hours. Most of our students were classroom teachers, graduate assistants, or preparing to become college instructors.
Because analyzing classroom discourse “provides an empirical and grounded approach to understanding how language”
is central to observing how interactions are constructed in
classrooms (Green & Stewart, 2012; Bloome et al., 2005),
we audio recorded each class meeting. During the following week Doug transcribed most of the recording so that we
could analyze the transcript before the next class meeting.
Our initial analysis and discussion led us to reflect on what
transpired during class and to reflexively plan the next session.
For the purposes of this article, the chosen interaction
occurred during the first class meeting (January 9). Students
were assigned to read “Disliking Books at an Early Age” by
Gerald Graff (2000), who reflects on the value and struggles
of acquiring a “critical vocabulary” for purposes of interpreting and talking about texts. We planned the first class as
a forum to introduce and model key interpretative principles
and practices for the course.
One principle, for example, focused on the necessity of
citing textual evidence when offering or refuting an interpretation; personal opinion or experience would represent only
a beginning. In a meeting before the first class, we agreed
to emphasize that principle; and during class both of us
modeled making a claim about a text, pointing to textual support, and proposing an interpretation.
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Justin’s Apparent Understanding of Graff ’s Text:
Near the end of the first class session, as we turned toward
Graff ’s essay, one of the students, Justin, offered an interpretation of the argument. He said, “The way that you perceive
[the text] is the way that you perceive it/…/I mean you’re not
wrong/it’s the way that you read it” (see Appendix B, Table
2, lines 364-370). Before the sequence represented in Table 2,
Justin pointed to an excerpt where Graff describes an epiphany: that his classmates’ stumblings “were not too far off
from the thoughts of/famous published critics.” Justin proposed an interpretation, stating that an inexperienced reader
or discussant of literature doesn’t have to “have a perfect
grasp of ” the community’s “framework” or “lexicon;” that
is, “if you understand that there is something significant” in
the text. Instead of addressing Justin’s point, Doug redirected
the response by stating, “to add on to” why Graff believes it
is “so important that we learn to talk about what we read….”
In other words, Doug dismissed Justin’s point by not directly
addressing it; instead, he reshaped it to create what he viewed
as a more accurate portrayal of Graff ’s text.
However, through transcribing and analyzing the sequence of the interaction, we observed that Justin had indeed offered a view of how students might develop more
confidence in talking about literature, particularly through
voiced “stumblings” or incomplete grasps of the text, which
Gadamer might describe as an openness to the text or an
awareness of the shortcomings of one’s foreknowledge. By
shifting from Justin’s perspective, Doug ignored an apparent rich point (Agar, 1996)—that is, a moment of confusion
that can occur between people during an interaction when
they have different assumptions or background experiences.
For example, the instructors expected students to cite textual
evidence when making claims about literature; Justin presumed—citing Graff—that inexperienced readers may offer
incomplete interpretations, demonstrating that they do not
have “a perfect grasp” of a text or the expected discourse
used in discussion of the text. Instead of exploring the difference, Doug implicitly dismissed Justin’s point.
In the next sequence, Elisabeth described more of
Graff ’s argument and offered a personal anecdote to clarify Graff ’s perspective. Justin then proposed a second interpretation of Graff ’s position (Table 2, lines 352-370)
as an implicit alternative to Elisabeth’s. He said that Graff
gained confidence when he learned that he didn’t have to be
right or wrong, that “the way that you perceive [the meaning of a text] is the way that you perceive it” (364); “I mean
you’re not wrong/ it’s the way that you read it” (369-370).
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Elisabeth interrupted, “but you’ve still got to explain it”
(373), and her emphasis on “explain” implied that interpretation is beyond right and wrong. Justin stated that he agreed;
however, he proposed an apparently dubious argument, “I
mean you can eventually figure out what you’re trying to say/
don’t feel bad/about not/being really intellectual” (385-389).
No one spoke for four seconds.
Once again, instead of encouraging Justin to offer clarification or helping him to shape or rephrase the argument
and his understanding of Graff, Elisabeth inhaled and slowly
exhaled; Doug broke the silence by shifting to another part
of Graff ’s text, ignoring Justin’s statement, presuming a lack
of understanding—and more importantly, an apparent commitment to personal opinion. Yet, analysis of the interaction
before the next class meeting suggested that Justin not only
reflected the practice of initiating an interpretation by pointing to evidence of the text and offering his understanding
of it, he also reflected the “stumblings” that Graff suggests
are indicative of students entering academic conversations.
In other words, on the first day of class, offering an initial interpretation of an assigned text, Justin reflected the practices
Graff suggested; however, the two instructors were listening
for a particular interpretative practice in demonstrating understanding of the text: citing textual evidence and refraining
from personal opinions.
Implications of Example Classroom Interaction:
Initially, during the class and immediately following it, we believed Justin suggested that right and wrong interpretations
do not matter, that perceptions or opinions are primary and
students need not worry about intellectual reasoning in their
responses to literature. Yet, after analyzing the transcript,
we recognized that Justin did indeed demonstrate an understanding of Graff ’s argument; however, because of our own
“horizons” as readers of Graff ’s text and of the situation
and purposes of the first class meeting, we could not see or
appreciate the understanding that Justin struggled to articulate. We did not understand his understanding, or the process
of arriving at his claim. In fact, Graff describes what we as
teachers and more experienced readers demonstrated: “Many
literate people learned certain ways of talking about books
so long ago that they have forgotten they ever had to learn
them. These people fail to understand the reading problems
of the struggling students who have still not acquired a critical vocabulary” (p. 45).
Through the analysis of the transcript, we recognized
that Justin, as he worked to present his perspective on Graff ’s
argument, displayed his discomfort and struggle through

the many pauses between words or phrases. We developed
a more accurate understanding of the interaction and of
Justin’s argument only after transcribing, analyzing, and discussing it. We recognized our missed opportunities to probe
Justin for clarification or lead him to explore nuances of his
argument. On the first day of class, we encouraged a particular approach to interpretation: that it does matter what you
say about a text and how you provide textual evidence for
the claim.

Conclusion and Implications
Based on an example from a college classroom, most
people would expect understanding to be complex. Yet, what
happens in the college classroom speaks to multiple ways understanding a literary text or argument might play out with
younger students. Although understanding can be defined as
a process and a product, instructional objectives that address
students’ understanding during class discussions are often
ambiguous. As teachers, we expect students to take risks and
demonstrate steps in a process toward developing understanding; yet, we simultaneously expect them to accurately
portray the argument of a text, or adhere to principles of a
preferred interpretative practice.
For example, at moments when students utter responses
to texts, we focus on apparent interpretative inaccuracies—
ones we might perceive as indicative of not reading. Instead,
we might observe the developmental nature of their responses, or the “stumblings” when engaging in a literary discussion
with a more informed other in the room—one who has typically read the text in question multiple times. We might recall,
as Gadamer suggests, that understanding is a relational term; it
is grounded in the linguistic and social, and therefore, there is
a negotiated aspect of the unfolding process of understanding within a community of people.
Of course, as teachers, we are expected to assess students’ understanding, and we are given the power to make
those evaluations—and we rarely have time to transcribe and
reflect on what transpired. However, there are consequences
of our assessments of students’ understandings, particularly
for what they have access to for learning, for how they perceive their own academic and personal development, and for
how they are evaluated and for what purposes. Therefore, we
must strive to make transparent to students what we mean by
understanding, how we arrive at understanding(s), and how
we represent them, to whom, under what conditions, and for
what purposes.
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By inviting students into the conversations of interpretation and understanding—such as the meeting we had before the first class—teachers can make visible to students the
negotiated nature of understanding within local contexts and
the implications for other contexts, situations when students
might need to transform their understandings (not simply
transfer them, as if that were possible). Gadamer argues that
understanding does not happen in a vacuum but in relation
to “tradition”—in other words, to a body of previously articulated understandings. Understanding is rarely—if ever—an
entirely singular or individual act, and like the learner of any
new discourse, we do not, indeed cannot, enter a tradition or
discourse of interpretation in full command of its language
usages, conventions, and established meanings.
As Wiggins and McTighe suggest, we learned that misunderstandings provide a rich moment to explore contextual
factors that lead to assessment of a students’ understandings.
Furthermore, if we put aside our ethnocentrism and ground
our observations in the interactions of the participants in
whom we are observing, we can grow closer to addressing
the complexities of understanding, guiding our students
along the way.
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Appendix A. Table 1. Examples in the CCSS of Understanding as a Noun
Qualities
Can be specified and required for college
readiness

Understanding
as a Noun

Sentence from CCSS (page number)
“Just as students must learn to read, write, speak, listen, and use language effectively in a variety of content
areas, so too must the Standards specify the literacy
skills and understandings required for college and
career readiness in multiple disciplines” (3).
Students expected to demonstrate and have “Indeed, the skills and understandings students are exapplicability outside of classroom
pected to demonstrate have wide applicability outside
the classroom or workplace” (3
Can be retained or developed and mastered “Students advancing through the grades are expected
to meet each year’s grade-specific standards, retain or
further develop skills and understandings mastered in
preceding grades, and work steadily toward meeting
the more general expectations described by the CCR
standards” (4).
Are embedded throughout the Standards
“The need to conduct research and to produce and
consume media is embedded into every aspect of
today’s curriculum. In like fashion, research and media
skills and understandings are embedded throughout
the Standards rather than treated in a separate section”
(4).
Are defined by broad standards and specific The CCR and grade-specific standards are necessary
ones and must be retained and demoncomplements—the former providing broad stanstrated
dards, the latter providing additional specificity—that
together define the skills and understandings that all
students must demonstrate” (10).
“Students advancing through the grades are expected
to meet each year’s grade-specific standards and retain
or further develop skills and understandings mastered
in preceding grades” (11).
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Appendix B. Table 2. Classroom Interaction Centered on Interpreting Texts
Speaker
Justin

Elisabeth
Justin

Elisabeth
Justin

Elisabeth
Doug
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Line
355
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
376
377
378
379
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388
389
390
391

Discourse
there’s debate between the critics
it was more so
that he gained the confidence that you
don’t necessarily
have a right
or a wrong=
=yeah
perspective
on how to [shifts]
I mean
the way that you perceive it is the way that
you perceive it
it’s ok if you see it one way
and
you know
[pause]
I mean you’re not wrong
it’s the way that you read it
so
this=
=but you’ve still got to explain it
you still got to put it=
=yeah right
that’s the other thing
you can’t
[pause]
and that’s why I thought he was kind of
‘it’s ok to not
be super complex and try to
I mean just
if you can talk your way around it
[pause]
I mean you can eventually figure out what
you’re trying to say
don’t feel bad about
not being
really intellectual
[pause]
[inhales as if to speak, but doesn’t]
[four-second pause before speaking]

Notes
Graff observed this
Voice quickens

Encouraging J to continue

i.e., the text

Tone suggests disagreement
Apparent agreement
Shifts
paraphrases Graff

